The "Problem" of "Unconceptualized Apples."

Over the last week, we have been grappling with the "problem" von Glasersfeld presents of the "unexperienced world." I do not see this as a problem at all, and that von Glasersfeld has misconstrued the entire question.

The "problem," as von Glasersfeld puts it, is that "we cannot possibly (rationally) conceive of an unexperienced world." I do not think that this statement is correct. We, as a species, possess an unlimited ability to conceive of things, to conceptualize, to rationalize. It is how our species has gotten to where it is today -- through advancements of conceptualizations, a process of developing theories, testing them, refining them, combining them, and generating ever more knowledge. It is how we have brought our understanding of the world to where it is today, how we have created the very words we are using to communicate and explain these concepts, the computers through which I am typing and you are reading, the electricity that powers the computer, the refinement of the materials to produce it, etc.

To reference the argument that Professor Johnson has been attempting to reconstruct, I hit a snag on premise 9, "An “unconceptualized apple” is not a concept." This is, I think, a false statement, because of the phrase "unconceptualized apple." There cannot exist an "unconceptualized apple." Simply the word "apple" contains the concept of apple, which we necessarily conceptualized, experienced or not. By invoking the very concept of apple in the use of the term, the "unconceptualized" qualifier has been negated.

One might argue that the terms "unexperienced" and "unconceptualized" are synonymous, thus negating my argument above. I think this is false, a misuse of terms. We can have concepts of things we have never experienced -- concepts of loss without ever having lost, concepts of unicorns without ever having experienced a unicorn. Though perhaps most damning is that of faith, of belief in a god without evidence (or despite evidence to the contrary). The mere fact that we have a concept of a thing like a god, and that some people can accept it as real despite the utter lack of evidence or experience to back up the belief in the concept, represents perhaps the most prevalent example of the conceptualization of the unexperienced, reflecting the gulf between our experiences and our concepts.

To end with a question: Is there, in fact, a difference between experience and conceptualization?