I was linked today to a very amusing article by Denis Dutton. Dutton, for a few years in the late 1990's, held an absolutely brilliant bad writing contest. And who were these bad writers whom Mr. Dutton was honoring for their dense, meaningless prose? Why, his very own colleagues -- college professors, mostly English professors, but some philosophy professors make it there, too.
Conveniently, Dutton wrote an essay explaining why he held this contest, an essay aptly named "Language Crimes." It is perhaps fitting that he targets English professors in particular, for these are the people who are supposed to be teaching students how to write -- while their own prose is sorely lacking in both style and, at times, real substance.
I should perhaps take offense at this (as some scholars certainly did). While I admit, there may be some need for technical language, is jargon really a requirement for everything? Is there truly a need for all of this obtuse prose? Do these theories really lose their power if explained in simpler, more accessible language?
To end with a couple of question: Do you think the winners of Dutton's Bad Writing Contest are samples of truly bad writing? Is bad writing a problem in academic writing?
Saturday, May 8, 2010
What Have We Learned?
Sarah asked "What have you learned?"
This is, of course, a rather loaded question, and doubtless one would have a different answer right at the end of the course than they might five, ten, twenty or more years down the line, so answering now could certainly provide an insight to my future self of how I once was (and in a public forum, no less! How delightfully narcissitic!).
I think I'll leave this in the form of a list.
1) I like eating meat, and will continue to do so, though I will certainly try to cut down on my consumption, and try to be more conscious of where it came from.
2) Socialists are not merely envious of those who excel.
3) Naturalism and supernaturalism will never find middle ground.
4) Time is real.
5) Radical constructivism, as it has so far been presented, is inherently unphilosophical, perhaps even anti-philosophical, because of its stubborn refusal to acknowledge the possibility of criticism.
6) I started this course as a constructive realist (or however we choose to name the philosophy). I now have a name for it, and the ability to explain and rationalize it.
To end with a very broad question that doubtless no one will tackle: What does it mean "to learn?"
This is, of course, a rather loaded question, and doubtless one would have a different answer right at the end of the course than they might five, ten, twenty or more years down the line, so answering now could certainly provide an insight to my future self of how I once was (and in a public forum, no less! How delightfully narcissitic!).
I think I'll leave this in the form of a list.
1) I like eating meat, and will continue to do so, though I will certainly try to cut down on my consumption, and try to be more conscious of where it came from.
2) Socialists are not merely envious of those who excel.
3) Naturalism and supernaturalism will never find middle ground.
4) Time is real.
5) Radical constructivism, as it has so far been presented, is inherently unphilosophical, perhaps even anti-philosophical, because of its stubborn refusal to acknowledge the possibility of criticism.
6) I started this course as a constructive realist (or however we choose to name the philosophy). I now have a name for it, and the ability to explain and rationalize it.
To end with a very broad question that doubtless no one will tackle: What does it mean "to learn?"
On Experience
"Every Experience is an experience of something." This seems so obvious that it would seem to be a truism, as "everything that is said is said by someone." And yet, it would seem to present quite a challenge to the metaphysical agnostic.
If this statement is true, that every experience is an experience of something, then would it not necessitate a world beyond our own consciousness to experience? And if it is false, well... radical constructivism implodes into solipsism. This seems fairly important for a philosophy whose basic tenet is a focus on "experience" rather than "reality."
This would seem, at first, to perhaps be a false dichotomy. Without something to experience, there can be no experience (unless you're a solipsist, in which case you're the only thing around -- and we can all agree that this idea is absurd). Why, then, is the radical constructivist so intent on denying the real world? Perhaps denying is too strong a word, but given how radical constructivists so love to attack realism as dogmatic and absurd, it seems ingenuous to try to maintain this agnosticism while constantly attacking and mocking one side of the equation, and ignoring the other.
I can already see how the radical constructivist might respond. "I simply do not understand constructivism." And thus, it falls into the trap of hypocrisy. This statement implies that anyone who "fully understands" radical constructivism would accept it dogmatically, unquestioningly. And on this ground I reject it. A philosophy that is so quick to act exactly as the system which it proposes to reject and offer an alternative to, particularly when it brushes off its criticism as being simply "misunderstood," is both academically dishonest, and frankly uninteresting for discussion.
To end with a question: is the above rejection of radical constructivism justified? Why or why not?
If this statement is true, that every experience is an experience of something, then would it not necessitate a world beyond our own consciousness to experience? And if it is false, well... radical constructivism implodes into solipsism. This seems fairly important for a philosophy whose basic tenet is a focus on "experience" rather than "reality."
This would seem, at first, to perhaps be a false dichotomy. Without something to experience, there can be no experience (unless you're a solipsist, in which case you're the only thing around -- and we can all agree that this idea is absurd). Why, then, is the radical constructivist so intent on denying the real world? Perhaps denying is too strong a word, but given how radical constructivists so love to attack realism as dogmatic and absurd, it seems ingenuous to try to maintain this agnosticism while constantly attacking and mocking one side of the equation, and ignoring the other.
I can already see how the radical constructivist might respond. "I simply do not understand constructivism." And thus, it falls into the trap of hypocrisy. This statement implies that anyone who "fully understands" radical constructivism would accept it dogmatically, unquestioningly. And on this ground I reject it. A philosophy that is so quick to act exactly as the system which it proposes to reject and offer an alternative to, particularly when it brushes off its criticism as being simply "misunderstood," is both academically dishonest, and frankly uninteresting for discussion.
To end with a question: is the above rejection of radical constructivism justified? Why or why not?
Friday, April 30, 2010
On the Usefulness of Quantum Physics
I have been giving some thought to quantum physics of late, and I would like to share my thoughts on the subject here.
Quantum physics studies the absolute smallest particles possible. There is no reason, therefore, that the properties of these subatomic particles would apply at the macro level. Why? Take, for example, table salt, sodium chloride. This molecule has neither the properties of sodium nor chlorine. It may well share some properties, but it lacks many others, and has its own unique properties. The same can be said of any molecule -- the whole does not equal the sum of its parts. Therefore, what works for a single atom may not work for a molecule or a collection of highly complex molecules.
Furthermore, quantum mechanics are still a relatively new science, and poorly understood. We do not yet know what exactly the smallest particles look like, or what they do, or if the properties we have currently identified CAN be applied on higher levels. This does not discount the usefulness of quantum mechanics. It is simply to suggest that, until we have a better understanding of them, a wider body of evidence, and experiments on a higher level, it is not useful to our considerations as philosophers.
To end with a question: is this analysis of quantum physics fair? Can we disregard this as-yet poorly understood field of science, and suspend our judgement until further research has been completed, or do we have an obligation to consider it, even if it is very likely to change as more data is collected and more experiments run?
Quantum physics studies the absolute smallest particles possible. There is no reason, therefore, that the properties of these subatomic particles would apply at the macro level. Why? Take, for example, table salt, sodium chloride. This molecule has neither the properties of sodium nor chlorine. It may well share some properties, but it lacks many others, and has its own unique properties. The same can be said of any molecule -- the whole does not equal the sum of its parts. Therefore, what works for a single atom may not work for a molecule or a collection of highly complex molecules.
Furthermore, quantum mechanics are still a relatively new science, and poorly understood. We do not yet know what exactly the smallest particles look like, or what they do, or if the properties we have currently identified CAN be applied on higher levels. This does not discount the usefulness of quantum mechanics. It is simply to suggest that, until we have a better understanding of them, a wider body of evidence, and experiments on a higher level, it is not useful to our considerations as philosophers.
To end with a question: is this analysis of quantum physics fair? Can we disregard this as-yet poorly understood field of science, and suspend our judgement until further research has been completed, or do we have an obligation to consider it, even if it is very likely to change as more data is collected and more experiments run?
Wednesday, April 28, 2010
The "Problem" of Unexperienced Rocks
Radical constructivism criticizes realism for its insistence on the existence of an unexperienced world. To the radical constructivist, at least as I understand it, the unexperienced rock, say on the bottom of the ocean, or the moon, is not relevant to our understanding of the world.
I would like to challenge that. Let us explore the concept of this unexperienced rock. Just because we have not experienced the rocks, say, on the moon, does not mean that we lack the POTENTIAL to experience them. If we act upon this potential, then this rock becomes part of our experience. It seems to me rather absurd to reject those objects which can potentially be experienced merely on the grounds that we have not yet experienced them.
I propose the following syllogism:
1) All rocks that are relevant to our understanding are those objects we have experienced.
2) All rocks must first have the potential to be experienced before they can be experienced.
3) Potential for experience remains unchanged regardless of whether that potential is acted upon.
4) All rocks that we have experienced can be potentially experienced.
5) All rocks must have the potential to be experienced.
6) Therefore, all rocks, both experienced and unexperienced (or, put another way, potentially, but not yet experienced) are relevant to our understanding of the concept of "rock."
Given this, it would be quite relevant that there is an unexperienced world, which calls in to question the metaphysical agnosticism the radical constructivist so clings to.
To end with a question: How might a radical constructivist respond to the syllogism above?
I would like to challenge that. Let us explore the concept of this unexperienced rock. Just because we have not experienced the rocks, say, on the moon, does not mean that we lack the POTENTIAL to experience them. If we act upon this potential, then this rock becomes part of our experience. It seems to me rather absurd to reject those objects which can potentially be experienced merely on the grounds that we have not yet experienced them.
I propose the following syllogism:
1) All rocks that are relevant to our understanding are those objects we have experienced.
2) All rocks must first have the potential to be experienced before they can be experienced.
3) Potential for experience remains unchanged regardless of whether that potential is acted upon.
4) All rocks that we have experienced can be potentially experienced.
5) All rocks must have the potential to be experienced.
6) Therefore, all rocks, both experienced and unexperienced (or, put another way, potentially, but not yet experienced) are relevant to our understanding of the concept of "rock."
Given this, it would be quite relevant that there is an unexperienced world, which calls in to question the metaphysical agnosticism the radical constructivist so clings to.
To end with a question: How might a radical constructivist respond to the syllogism above?
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